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INTRODUCTION
In the continuing national debate about the scope of the Second Amend-
ment right to keep and bear arms,' much conversation revolves around the rela-
tionship between private gun ownership and crime rates. Opponents and advo-
cates of gun-control laws support their positions with frequent citation to
evidence of a correlation (or lack thereof) between laws that allow individuals to
carry and use guns in self-defense and crime rates. The effect of gun laws on
crime rates, however, is only one of the implications gun control laws have for
our criminal justice system. While crime rates are certainly a valuable metric
with which to analyze the effectiveness of gun-control laws, they tell only part of
the story. Many of the most important rules in our justice system, such as the
presumption of innocence, the reasonable doubt standard, and self-defense
protections, are based not on raw empirics but on moral value judgments about
the type of error society is willing to risk. A more complete analysis must con-
sider not only the empirical effect of gun laws on crime rates, but also the sys-
tematic theoretical implications of self-defense rules-of which gun laws are a
significant part-on error risk in the justice system.
This Note fills the gap in the current literature on gun laws by framing the
justice system as a careful balance of different types of error risk and arguing
that gun laws have a particular place in that balance. Specifically, I argue that
the type of error society is willing to risk in defensive shootings can be seen as a
counterweight in this balance to the type of error society is willing to risk in
criminal convictions. Any normative evaluation of gun laws, therefore, must
consider the implications of permissive or restrictive rules for the error-risk bal-
ance, above and beyond the statistical relationship between the laws and crime
rates.
The criminal justice system in the United States can be understood as a so-
phisticated and refined process of crime solving, culminating in the conviction
of the guilty and the protection of the innocent. Under this view, crime and
conviction rates may be the most important measures of a successful system. Of
course, the reality is far more nuanced in several ways. First, the criminal proc-
ess begins not with the commission of any crime, but with the actions individu-
als may take to prevent a crime from ever being committed. Rules governing
when and how members of society may prevent or stop crimes ex ante have an
important role in the justice system because they determine whether the legal
structures that are triggered with the commission of a crime go into operation
at all.
1. This debate is likely to be reignited by the Supreme Court's forthcoming decision
in District of Columbia v. Heller, in which it will consider for the first time whether
the District of Columbia's strict gun-control laws "violate the Second Amend-
ment rights of individuals who are not affiliated with any state-regulated militia,
but who wish to keep handguns and other firearms for private use in their
homes." 128 S.Ct. 645, 645 (2007).
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Second, the justice system is not merely determining who is, in fact, guilty;
it is prioritizing error risks. The role of error risk is discussed in greater detail
later in this Note, but a brief introduction to the concept is necessary in order to
proceed. To understand the role of error risk in the justice system, one needs to
break down the path from crime to conviction (or acquittal) into a series of de-
cisions, each with its own attendant error risk. For instance, an innocent person
may be prosecuted and sent to jail if the state makes an incorrect evaluation of a
suspect's culpability. Similarly, a guilty person may escape consequence at each
decision point. The choices about which default rules and protections govern
the decisions up to and including conviction or acquittal tell us whether society
would rather risk the former or the latter type of error. As I show below, an ex-
amination of two of the fundamental tenets underlying the criminal process-
the presumption of innocence and the requirement of proof beyond a reason-
able doubt-clearly favor acquitting the guilty over convicting the innocent.
Though the rules of prosecution tend to favor one type of error risk, the
other type of error risk is in play in the rules that operate before the commission
of a crime to allow potential victims to protect themselves. It is these self-
defense protections to which gun control laws relate. Generally, when individu-
als are allowed to keep and use guns in self-defense they are better able to pro-
tect themselves against the threat of crime (whether perceived or actual). This
results in the risk that, at least occasionally, when an individual reasonably be-
lieves himself to be at risk and legally shoots his perceived assailant, he will in-
correctly shoot a person who meant him no harm.
The comparison of the following two true stories about the lawful use of a
gun in self-defense is a helpful introduction to the type of error that is at risk
with self-defense laws. On the one hand, take local Alabama hero Thomas
Terry. His story is described by gun rights advocates as follows:
Thomas Terry walked into a Shoney's restaurant in Anniston, Ala-
bama, expecting nothing more than a quick meal. Instead, he found
himself face-to-face with two armed robbers, crazed gunmen who had
terrorized the other restaurant patrons, and were working themselves
into a frenzy, on the verge of an orgy of violence. Only then did Terry
pull the concealed .45-caliber handgun Alabama law allowed him to
carry. The thugs fired, one of them grazing Terry's hip. Terry's aim was
more sure. He shot one of the armed robbers to death, and wounded
the other to a degree that took him out of the fight.'
When Terry fired his gun, he took (at least hypothetically) a risk that those he
perceived to be attackers would turn out to be innocent, that they would be
shot in error. Of course, the risk of error seems quite low here, as the "crazed
gunmen" seemed unmistakably out to cause harm; indeed, Terry's decision to
2. WAYNE LAPIERRE & JAMES JAY BAKER, SHOOTING STRAIGHT: TELLING THE
TRUTH ABOUT GUNS IN AMERICA 60-61 (2002) (citing Timothy Wheeler, Opin-
ion, Life and Death in the City: Two Restaurants, Two Robberies, Two Outcomes,
SAN DIEGO UNION TRIB., May 31, 2000, at B-7).
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shoot turned out not to have been in error. Nonetheless, the risk that he might
have been wrong was present, however low.
On the other hand, consider the example of homeowner Rodney Peairs,
who took the same risk and turned out to be wrong. In October 1992, Yoshihiro
Hattori, a Japanese exchange student who was living in Louisiana, and an
American friend approached the home of Peairs, looking for a Halloween party.
When Peairs's wife opened the door, she was frightened by the boys in costume
and yelled for Peairs to get his gun. Hattori did not understand Peairs's com-
mand to freeze, so Peairs shot and killed him. The next year, Peairs was acquit-
ted in a criminal trial (though a civil case did award damages to the victim's
family).'
In both of these instances, a citizen lawfully shot a perceived attacker in
self-defense. In the first, the perception of danger turned out to have been cor-
rect. In the second, the perception was incorrect, and an innocent person was
shot. Critically, however, the self-defense law provided that no crime was com-
mitted by either shooter because both reasonably believed themselves to be in
danger. Self-defense law privileges the risk that an innocent non-criminal like
Hattori will be erroneously perceived to be an attacker and therefore shot over
the risk that criminals like the Alabama gunmen will be allowed to commit their
crimes uninterrupted. This Note argues that these error-risk calculations are
inherently relevant to permissive gun laws and thus must be considered when
evaluating the propriety and effectiveness of those laws.
In this Note, I examine the error risk inherent in two different environ-
ments of crime prevention and punishment: the operation of criminal courts
after the commission of a crime and personal self-defense with guns to prevent
a crime from occurring. Indeed, the two have been compared academically be-
fore:
[G]un use by private citizens against violent criminals and burglars is
common and about as frequent as legal actions like arrests, is a more
prompt negative consequence of crime than legal punishment, and is
more severe, at its most serious, than legal system punishments .... Se-
rious predatory criminals perceive a risk from victim gun use that is
roughly comparable to that of criminal justice system actions .... 4
This Note looks at conviction on the one hand and defensive shootings on the
other as two ways those suspected of causing harm to others are ultimately
judged, where the risk of error has the greatest consequences.
3. Adam Nossiter, Judge Awards Damages in Japanese Youth's Death, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 16, 1994, at A12; see also Ian Ayres & John J. Donohue, Shooting Down the
"More Guns, Less Crime" Hypothesis, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1193, 120o n.12 (2003).
4. Gary Kleck, The Nature of Defensive Gun Use and the Deterrence and Displacement
of Crime, in THE GREAT AMERICAN GUN DEBATE: ESSAYS ON FIREARMS & VIO-
LENCE 252 (Don B. Kates, Jr. & Gary Kleck eds., 1997) [hereinafter Kleck, The Na-
ture of Defensive Gun Use].
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I argue that laws protecting the innocent against criminal conviction and
laws allowing individuals to protect themselves from criminal attack prioritize
opposite types of risk. To that extent, each type of risk prioritization can be seen
as in careful balance with the other: enough protection of the innocent in the
court system, despite the risk that some guilty people will be acquitted, is bal-
anced by enough room for self-defense to prohibit potential crime victims from
being attacked, despite the risk that some non-criminals will be shot. If one as-
sumes the status quo to generate a particular balance of these risks, change in
the relevant laws creates change in the balance. Specifically, more permissive
gun laws facilitate the exercise of self-defense (at the expense of the safety of
perceived attackers) and therefore put a finger on the self-defense side of the
error-risk scale. The current debate over the correlation between guns and
crime should consider that disruption before drawing normative conclusions
about the benefit of these laws.
The Note proceeds as follows: Part I briefly examines current gun use in
America and the literature on the purported causal connection between gun
laws and crime rates. Part II sets up the theoretical landscape of my argument
by explaining the concept of error risk in greater detail. Part III turns this lens
on two techniques that minimize false positives: reasonable doubt and the pre-
sumption of innocence. Part IV looks at rules on the other side of the error-risk
calculus: the false-negative-minimizing self-defense rules. Part V then integrates
the right-to-carry and shoot-in-self-defense laws into the error-risk picture that
has been drawn. The Note concludes by considering the importance of error-
risk analysis to policy makers considering not only gun laws but any other deci-
sion-making regime.
I. GUNS, CRIME, AND SCHOLARSHIP
Before delving into the error-risk analysis that forms the basis for this
Note's argument, it is valuable to briefly survey the landscape of gun use in
America and the legal literature that analyzes it. The arguments presented in
this literature are essential to understanding both the significance of gun laws
and the gaps in current scholarly analysis of legal defensive killings.
A. Guns in America
By today's best estimates, there are at least 200 million firearms in the
hands of American civilians.' Across the political and ideological spectrum, it is
widely agreed that the primary reason Americans keep guns is for self-
5. Philip J. Cook & Jens Ludwig, Pragmatic Gun Policy, in EVALUATING GUN POLICY:
EFFECTS ON CRIME AND VIOLENCE 3 (Jens Ludwig & Philip J. Cook eds., 2003)
(citing PHILIP J. COOK & JENS LUDWIG, GUNS IN AMERICA (1996)). Gary Kleck es-
timates the number as "over 230 million." Gary Kleck, The Frequency of Defensive
Gun Use, in THE GREAT AMERICAN GUN DEBATE, supra note 4, at 184 [hereinafter
Kleck, The Frequency of Defensive Gun Use].
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protection. 6 The exact number of annual defensive gun uses is harder to esti-
mate. The government-sponsored National Crime Victimization Survey
(NCVS) has found that guns are used in self-defense approximately io8,ooo
times per year,7 though this number is the subject of some debate.' By every es-
timate, however, the point for purposes of this Note holds: many Americans
keep guns and use them for self-defense.
Of course, most defensive gun uses involve merely brandishing or threaten-
ing to shoot a gun without any shots being fired.9 Nonetheless, even ardent
gun-rights advocates acknowledge that, "[alithough shootings of criminals rep-
resent a small fraction of defensive uses of guns, Americans nevertheless shoot
criminals with a frequency that must be regarded as remarkable by any stan-
dard."1 No national data exists on the frequency of legal defensive killings,
though Gary Kleck has attempted to extrapolate estimates from local statistics,
concluding that there are between io,ooo and 20,000 legal shootings of crimi-
nals-or at least those perceived to be criminals-per year." This Note takes a
theoretical look at these cases of defensive shootings from an error-risk perspec-
6. On the anti-gun control side, see, for example, Gary Kleck, Keeping, Carrying, and
Shooting Guns for Self-Protection, in THE GREAT AMERICAN GUN DEBATE, supra
note 4, at 202-03 [hereinafter Kleck, Keeping, Carrying, and Shooting Guns for Self-
Protection] (describing the finding that 89% of gun owners have a gun mainly or
partly for protection). With a more neutral perspective, see, for example, Cook &
Ludwig, supra note 5, at 2 ("For many of those who do keep a gun, the paramount
reason is self-protection.").
7. Philip J. Cook et al., The Gun Debate's New Mythical Number: How Many Defen-
sive Uses Per Year?, 16 J. POL'y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 463, 468 (1997). This includes
incidents in which guns were fired in self-defense and those in which guns were
merely brandished.
8. See id. (supporting the NCVS estimate); see also DAVID HEMENWAY, PRIVATE
GUNS, PUBLIC HEALTH (2004) (same); Gary Kleck & Marc Getz, Armed Resistance
to Crime: The Prevalence and Nature of Self-Defense with a Gun, 86 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 150, 164 (1995) (estimating up to 2.5 million defensive gun uses per
year); Kleck, The Frequency of Defensive Gun Use, supra note 5, at 160-75 (describ-
ing the NCVS as a dramatic underestimate).
9- Kleck, Keeping, Carrying, and Shooting Guns for Self-Protection, supra note 6, at
193. As John Donohue has explained, brandishing incidents, in which a particular
crime or killing is averted by the potential victim brandishing a gun and scaring
off the assailant, may represent "crime transfer" rather than "crime reduction."
John Donohue, Guns, Crime, and the Impact of State Right-to-Carry Laws, 73
FORDHAM L. REV. 623, 627 (2004). For more on the nature of defensive gun use
incidents, see Kleck, The Nature of Defensive Gun Use, supra note 4, at 225-26
tbl.8.1.
1O. Kleck, Keeping, Carrying, and Shooting Guns for Self-Protection, supra note 6, at
194.
11. Id. at 195, 196-97 tbl.7.1,199 & 202.
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tive to claim they must become a bigger part of any policy debate about gun
control.
B. The Guns and Crime Debate
To date, the vast literature on the connection between private gun owner-
ship and crime rates has focused on whether there is a positive or negative cor-
relation between the former and the latter, or whether there is any correlation at
all. 2 Jens Ludwig and Philip Cook, who have written extensively on the issue,
note that though there is widespread acknowledgement that guns have benefi-
cial effects on crime prevention, a debate remains:
What is in dispute is the magnitude of these [positive] effects and their
implications for public policy. How often do victims succeed in using a
gun to avoid serious injury? To what extent does the private ownership
of guns serve as a deterrent to violence? 3
These questions are significant because if the magnitude of crime prevention is
small in comparison to the negative costs of permissive gun laws-for example,
frequent erroneous defensive shootings or accidental injuries-then policy-
makers might conclude that the crime-prevention benefits are not worth the
risk of widespread gun ownership. It is the empirical questions about the mag-
nitude of the correlation between guns and crime that have been at the heart of
much of the guns and crime literature thus far.
On the one hand, a group of scholars argues that empirical evidence sup-
ports the theory that private gun ownership reduces crime because it deters
criminals. 4 As John Lott, one of the most prominent (and controversial) writers
12. See, e.g., JOHN R. LOTT, JR., MORE GUNS, LESS CRIME: UNDERSTANDING CRIME
AND GUN-CONTROL LAWS (2d ed. 2000) (concluding that guns make us safer);
Ayres & Donohue, supra note 3, at 1200 n.12; Kleck & Getz, supra note 8. For a
summary of the literature on this topic, see GREGG LEE CARTER, GUN CONTROL
IN THE UNITED STATES: A REFERENCE HANDBOOK 18-20 (2006).
13. PHILIP J. COOK & JENS LUDWIG, GUN VIOLENCE 36 (2000).
14. See, e.g., JOHN R. LOTT, THE BIAS AGAINST GUNS 8-11 (2003) (providing anecdotal
evidence of very "determined and motivated criminals [who] altered their plans"
because of knowledge or suspicion that their original targets would be armed); see
also GARY KLECK, TARGETING GUNS: FIREARMS AND THEIR CONTROL (1997)
[hereinafter KLECK, TARGETING GUNS] (reviewing research and concluding that
gun control laws are ineffective in preventing violent crime); John R. Lott & David
Mustard, Crime, Deterrence, and Right-to-Carry Concealed Handguns, 26 J. Legal
Stud. 1, 1 (1997) (finding that "allowing citizens to carry concealed weapons deters
violent crimes, without increasing accidental deaths"); William Alan Bartley &
Mark Cohen, The Effect of Concealed Weapons Laws: An Extreme Bound Analysis,
36 ECON. INQUIRY 258 (1998) (supporting Lott and Mustard's findings on deter-
rence effects); Dan A. Black & Daniel S. Nagin, Do Right-to-Carry Laws Deter Vio-
lent Crime?, 27 J. LEGAL. STUD. 209 (1998) (supporting Lott and Mustard's find-
ings); Stephen G. Bronars & John R. Lott, Criminal Deterrence, Geographic
Spillovers, and the Right to Carry Concealed Handguns, 82 AM. EcON. REV. 475, 479
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in the field, claims, "when crime becomes more difficult, less crime is commit-
ted."' 5 He has analyzed data on guns and crime and concludes that "[a]llowing
citizens to carry concealed handguns reduces violent crimes, and the reductions
coincide very closely with the number of concealed-handgun permits issued.'
6
Lott also concludes that "[m]ass shootings in public places are reduced when
law-abiding citizens are allowed to carry concealed handguns."17 Furthermore, a
proven deterrent effect may support not only the argument that permissive gun
laws are a good idea, but also the argument that they are morally obligatory.'"
Other scholars line up behind Lott and make similar arguments about the rela-
tionship between guns and crime.' 9
Squaring off against Lott and his supporters is a group of scholars who ar-
gue not only that Lott's empirical analysis is flawed, but also that the Lott side
fails to consider ways in which murder rates can increase through the passage of
shall-issue laws"° "even if no permit holder ever commits a crime."21 Professor
John J. Donohue explains:
(1998) (concluding that "concealed handguns deter criminals and that the largest
reductions in violent crime will be obtained when all the states adopt these laws").
15. LOTT, supra note 12, at 1g.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Cf Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Is Capital Punishment Morally Required?
Acts, Omissions, and Life-Life Tradeoffs, 58 STAN. L. REV. 703, 705 (2005) (arguing
that, if capital punishment is successfully proven to have a deterrent effect, it
"may be morally required, not for retributive reasons, but rather to prevent the
taking of innocent lives"). For more on how Sunstein and Vermeule's moral obli-
gation thesis fits into the gun control and crime debate, see infra Section V.B.
19. See KLECK, TARGETING GUNS, supra note 14; Bronars & Lott, supra note 14; Lott &
Mustard, supra note 14.
20. "Shall-issue" laws refer to the requirement that states must ("shall") issue a gun
permit to anyone who meets the uniform requirements established by state law;
currently, there are thirty-six "shall-issue" states. See Nat'l Rifle Ass'n, Right-to-
Carry 2007, http://www.nraila.org//Issues/FactSheets/ Read.aspx?ID=18 (last vis-
ited Mar. 5, 20o8); see also infra note 95 and accompanying text.
21. John J. Donohue, The Impact of Concealed Carry Laws, in EVALUATING GUN POL-
ICY, supra note 5, at 290; see also H. RICHARD UVILLER, VIRTUAL JUSTICE: THE
FLAWED PROSECUTION OF CRIME IN AMERICA 95 (1996) ("[Miore handguns law-
fully in civilian hands will not reduce deaths from bullets and cannot stop the
predators from enforcing their criminal demands and expressing their lethal pur-
poses with the most effective tool they can get their hands on."); Ayres &
Donohue, supra note 3 (finding the data do not support Lott's hypothesis);
Hashem Dezhbakhsh & Paul H. Rubin, Lives Saved or Lives Lost? The Effects of
Concealed-Handgun Laws on Crime, 88 AM. ECON. REV. 468, 468 (1998) (arguing
that "Lott and Mustard's findings are suspect"); Mark Duggan, More Guns, More
Crime, 109 J. POL. ECON. 1086 (2001) (finding that increased gun ownership is
strongly correlated with increased homicide rates); Jens Ludwig, Concealed-Gun-
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First, knowing that members of the public are armed may encourage
criminals to carry guns and use them more quickly, resulting in more
felony murders. Second .... the massive theft of guns each year means
that anything that increases the number of guns in America will likely
increase the flow of guns into the hands of criminals, who may use
them to commit murders. Notably, the typical gun permit holder is a
middle-aged Republican white male, which is a group at relatively low
risk of violent criminal victimization with or without gun ownership,
so it is not clear whether substantial crime reduction benefits are likely
to occur by arming this group further.22
Donohue analyzes both of these hypotheses from an empirical perspective, and
concludes that it is impossible to draw a causal conclusion about the effect of
the passage of gun laws on crime rates. 3
Authors also consider other ways in which gun ownership may increase
gun violence without affecting crime rates-namely through accidental shoot-
ings 4 and suicides. 5 Aside from select anecdotes such as the story of the unfor-
tunate trick-or-treater, Hattori, 6 discussions about the significance of the gun
owner who legally shoots in self-defense, injuring or killing his potential assail-
ant, are largely absent from any discussion in the current literature on gun laws
and crime rates. Because the law permits such a gun owner to use his gun to
Carrying Laws and Violent Crime: Evidence from State Panel Data, 18 INT'L REV. L.
& ECON. 239, 239 (1998) ("My results suggest that shall-issue laws have resulted, if
anything, in an increase in adult homicide rates."); Franklin Zimring & Gordon
Hawkins, Concealed Handguns: The Counterfeit Deterrent, RESPONSIVE COMMU-
NITY, Spring 1997, at 46 (1997) (arguing that concealed weapons do not have a de-
terrent effect on crime).
22. Donohue, supra note 21, at 325.
23. Id. at 290.
24. See LOTT, supra note 14, at 141-44 (2003) (discussing the relationship between safe
storage laws and accidental deaths due to firearms); David Klein et al., Some Social
Characteristics of Young Gunshot Fatalities, 9 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS & PREVENTION
177, 181 (1977) (finding that guns kept for self-defense were responsible for "most"
fatal gun accidents involving victims under the age of sixteen in Michigan be-
tween 197o and 1975). Klein has also tied the notion of defensive gun use to lack of
faith in the law enforcement system, finding that families kept loaded guns in the
home where "they had no confidence that the police offered them protection
against neighborhood crime." David Klein, Societal Influences on Childhood Acci-
dents, 12 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS & PREVENTION 275, 277 (1980). The connection be-
tween private gun ownership and distrust of law enforcement will be discussed
further infra Part VI.
25. See KLECK, TARGETING GUNS, supra note 14, at 287 ("[P]revious studies failed to
make a solid case for the ability of gun controls to reduce the total suicide rate.");
Mark Duggan, Guns and Suicide, in EVALUATING GUN POLICY, supra note 5, at 41.
26. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
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protect himself, he has committed no crime,27 and yet the number of deaths or
injuries due to guns increases every time one of these shootings occurs. Of
course, if one assumes that the self-defender's judgment that he was in danger
was correct, this injury can be viewed as merely a replacement-the injured as-
sailant rather than the injured victim-and a replacement that society might
well tolerate comfortably. But the correctness of the self-defender's judgment is
not guaranteed; indeed, there are myriad tragic anecdotes about incorrect self-
defense shootings." It is this error risk that I argue must be considered in any
discussion attempting to examine the connection between guns and crime. 9
27. See Gilmore v. Taylor, 508 U.S. 333, 359 (1993) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("Despite
its status as an affirmative defense, however, self-defense converts what is other-
wise murder into justifiable homicide. In other words, the person who kills in self-
defense, instead of being guilty of murder, is guilty of no offense at all."), See gen-
erally I WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 6.4 (2d ed. 2003)
("There are, of course, some situations where, though A intentionally kills or in-
jures B, A is not guilty of murder or battery. Though he kills B, he may be
guilty... of no crime at all (e.g., when he is privileged to kill or injure B in self-
defense, or to prevent B's commission of a felony).").
28. See, e.g., test accompanying supra note 3 (recounting the story of the trick-or-
treating Japanese exchange student). Of course, erroneous shootings can occur at
the hands of police as well as private citizens; consider the example of Amadou
Diallo, the unarmed Guinean immigrant who was shot forty-one times when four
police officers mistook his wallet for a gun. See Robert D. McFadden, Four Officers
Indicted for Murder in Killing of Diallo, Lawyer Says, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 1999, at
B6. The Diallo case can be seen to counter the point that erroneous shootings are
the product of arming citizens particularly. This argument will be discussed in
further detail infra Part VI. For now, I merely use the case to illustrate the point
that even with good intentions and training, people can make mistakes when
shooting in self-defense.
29. Dan Kahan and Donald Braman have also responded to the guns and crime de-
bate by locating battles over gun control in questions of risk toleration; they
sparked a debate with Philip Cook and Jens Ludwig over their thesis. See Dan M.
Kahan & Donald Braman, More Statistics, Less Persuasion: A Cultural Theory of
Gun-Risk Perception, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1291 (2003) [hereinafter Kahan & Braman,
More Statistics, Less Persuasion]; Philip J. Cook & Jens Ludwig, Fact-Free Gun Pol-
icy?, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1329 (2003); Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, Caught in
the Cross-Fire: A Defense of the Cultural Theory of Gun-Risk Perception, 151 U. PA.
L. REV. 1395 (2003) [herinafter, Kahan & Brama, Caught in the Cross-Fire]; see also
Donald Braman et al., Modeling Facts, Culture, and Cognition in the Gun Debate,
18 Soc. JUST. RES. 203 (2005) (further responding to critics of their risk-
perception thesis). Kahan and Braman argue-and Cook and Ludwig refute their
claim-that whether or not one supports gun control is largely a result of whether
one believes in the risk of "insufficient regulation [of guns that] will make citizens
vulnerable to deliberate or accidental shootings," or "excessive regulation [of guns
that] will leave citizens unable to defend themselves against violent predation."
Kahan & Braman, More Statistics, Less Persuasion, supra, at 1299. This conclusion
by individuals, they posit, is largely the result of cultural values. Id. While both the
Kahan and Braman papers and this Note address risks associated with gun laws,
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1I. AN OVERVIEW OF ERROR-RISK MINIMIZATION
The idea that society prefers to release the guilty than imprison the inno-
cent is at the heart of the operation of our criminal courts. It is this axiomatic
principle that undergirds the error-minimization system governing standards
for convictions and prosecutions, and it is this principle that I suggest is in ten-
sion with right-to-carry laws (and other permissive gun laws).
Scientists refer to two types of errors: false positives (which are sometimes
called type-1 errors) and false negatives (which are sometimes called type-2 er-
rors).3 These errors can be understood as a measure of the effectiveness of any
decision in achieving its goal. If the goal of the decision-maker is to correctly
identify fact X, a false positive will diagnose the fact as present when it is not,
while a false negative will diagnose the fact as absent when it is really present. In
the criminal courts, the goal can be understood as the conviction of the guilty
party. Thus, a false-positive conviction error would be the erroneous conviction
of an innocent man, and a false-negative conviction error would be the errone-
ous acquittal of a guilty one.31 Similarly, when someone shoots in self-defense,
her goal can be understood as the successful prevention of a crime. She makes a
false-positive error if she shoots someone who is not actually an assailant and a
false-negative error if she fails to shoot someone who is. 2
When any decision is made, the decision-maker risks either a false-positive
or false-negative error.33 This holds true in the legal system as it chooses one
side over another. As the Supreme Court has pointed out, "[ihere is always in
litigation a margin of error, representing error in fact-finding, which both par-
ties must take into account." 34 Accordingly, consideration of the error-risk in-
herent in any given decision becomes part of the deliberative process. Through-
out history, legal systems have been built around the notion that, when it comes
to the government depriving citizens of life, liberty, property, or even reputa-
tion, false-negative errors are preferable to false-positive errors. In other words,
their focus on the cultural context of risk perception is quite different from the
notion of error risk I examine.
30. See generally Douglas Allchin, Error Types, 9 PERSP. ON SCI. 38 (2001).
31. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 370-71 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
32. This concept does not assume that it is always or ever the correct decision (on a
moral basis) for a person to shoot a perceived attacker. Any such assumption im-
plies a normative evaluation of whether guns should or should not be used in self-
defense. That evaluation is beyond the scope of this Note. Rather, I focus on the
error-risk implications of any decision to use a gun in self-defense as they fit into
the larger framework of error tolerance in the criminal justice system.
33. Cf. Winship, 397 U.S. at 370-71 ("[T]he trier of fact will sometimes, despite his best
efforts, be wrong in his factual conclusions. In a lawsuit between two parties, a
factual error can make a difference in one of two ways.").
34. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525 (1958).
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as Blackstone said, "it is better that ten guilty persons escape, than that one in-
nocent suffer."35
This idea did not originate with Blackstone.36 Indeed, the same principle
can be traced back to ancient civilizations,37 though the number of guilty men at
risk varies depending on context and commentator. This varying number of
guilty men-what Alexander Volokh has referred to as the "n guilty men" prin-
ciple3--can be seen as a measurement of society's false-negative-error toler-
ance. A brief survey of the historical use of the n guilty men principle shows
that, though the level of tolerance varies, society has long been concerned with
avoiding false-positive errors.3 9 Though the magnitude of the "n guilty men"
principle is a subject of dispute-how many guilty men is it worth releasing to
avoid the conviction of one innocent-the idea that such a ratio exists is perva-
sive.40 And indeed it has been built into the structure of our criminal justice sys-
tem.
35. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *358.
36. The io:i ratio Blackstone expressed has gained such prominence in American legal
thinking, however, that it has become known as the "Blackstone ratio." William S.
Laufer, The Rhetoric of Innocence, 70 WASH. L. REV. 329, 333 n.17 (1995).
37. For a wonderful explanation of the "n guilty men" principle and its historical ori-
gins, see Alexander Volokh, n Guilty Men, 146 U. PENN. L. REV. 173 (1997); see also
Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453-56 (1895) (tracing the history of the pre-
sumption of innocence standard).
38. Volokh, supra note 37.
39. The Coffin Court collects and describes a number of examples of this historical
concern. See Coffin, 156 U.S. at 454-55. For example, the biblical story of the city of
Sodom includes a promise by the Lord to Abraham that he would not destroy the
wicked city and all its inhabitants if ten righteous men would be destroyed in the
process. Genesis 18:23-32. Greenleaf notes that "the rule of the Roman law was in
the same spirit," holding that it was better to let the crime of a guilty person go
unpunished than to condemn the innocent. 3 GREENLEAF ON EVIDENCE § 29 n.4
(quoting Dig. L. 48, tit. 19, 1.5). John Fortescue expressed the sentiment even more
dramatically: "Indeed, one would much rather that twenty guilty persons should
escape the punishment of death than that one innocent person should be con-
demned and suffer capitally." JOHN FORTESCUE, DE LAUDIBuS LEGUM ANGLIAE
94 (Frederick Gregor trans., 1984) (1874). Finally, demonstrating that this princi-
ple was carried across the Atlantic to the New Republic, Benjamin Franklin re-
marked in 1785 "that it is better [one hundred] guilty Persons should escape than
that one innocent Person should suffer." Letter from Benjamin Franklin to Ben-
jamin Vaughan (Mar. 14, 1785), in 9 THE WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 291,
293 (Alfred H. Smyth ed. 19o6).
40. Volokh, supra note 37; see also Coffin, 156 U.S. at 453-56 (discussing the historical
evidence that "[tihe principle that there is a presumption of innocence in favor of
the accused is the undoubted law, axiomatic and elementary, and its enforcement
lies at the foundation of the administration of our criminal law").
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III. FALSE-POSITIVE MINIMIZATION: PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE
AND REASONABLE DOUBT
Society's preference for false-negative to false-positive errors where matters
of life and liberty are at stake can be seen clearly in two important elements of
the criminal prosecutions: the presumption of innocence and the reasonable
doubt standard.
The decision to presume a suspect innocent can be understood as the first
in a series of decisions that are made in a criminal prosecution. In establishing
the default rule for the consideration of an accusation, the accused can be pre-
sumed to be innocent or guilty.41 If he is presumed innocent, the government
bears the burden of proving him guilty; should it not he will be acquitted. The
presumption of innocence incurs the risk that a guilty man will be acquitted (a
false-negative error). Conversely, if we presumed the accused to be guilty, the
defendant would bear the burden of establishing his own innocence; should he
not, he would be convicted. Under a presumption-of-guilt system, the risk
would be of false-positive errors-the chance that an innocent man will be
found guilty is increased. Thus, because we prefer false-negative to false-positive
errors, we choose the default rule that risks false-negative over false-positive er-
rors: presuming innocence.
42
The Supreme Court has held that "[t]he principle that there is a presump-
tion of innocence in favor of the accused is the undoubted law, axiomatic and
elementary, and its enforcement lies at the foundation of the administration of
our criminal law." 43 Although this was not expressed explicitly until 1895, the
Court noted that the roots of the presumption are deep: "[ilt is stated as un-
questioned in the text-books, and has been referred to as a matter of course in
the decisions of this court and in the courts of the several States.
'44
While the presumption of innocence is perhaps more deeply ingrained in
our justice system than the reasonable doubt standard, the two are error-risk
41. In Coffin, the Supreme Court pointed to an anecdote from ancient Rome which
illustrates this construction:
Numerius, the governor of Narbonensis, was on trial before the Em-
peror, and, contrary to the usage in criminal cases, the trial was public.
Numerius contented himself with denying his guilt, and there was not
sufficient proof against him. His adversary, Delphidius, "a passionate
man," seeing that the failure of the accusation was inevitable, could not
restrain himself, and exclaimed, "Oh, illustrious Caesar! if it is sufficient
to deny, what hereafter will become of the guilty?" to which Julian re-
plied, "If it suffices to accuse, what will become of the innocent?"
Coffin, 156 U.S. at 455 (quoting RERUM GESTARUM lib. 18, c. 1).
42. See Speiser v. Randall, 357 US. 513, 526 (1958) ("Due process commands that no
man shall lose his liberty unless the Government has borne the burden of.. . con-
vincing the factfinder of his guilt.")
43. Coffin, 156 U.S. at 453.
44. Id. at 454 (collecting sources).
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parallels. The reasonable doubt standard "provides concrete substance for the
presumption of innocence" 4 5-and it similarly operates on the principle of
minimizing false-positive errors. The Supreme Court has said in no uncertain
terms that "the Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction ex-
cept upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute
the crime with which he is charged." 46 The purpose of the standard, as the
Court put it, is "to safeguard men from dubious and unjust convictions, with
resulting forfeitures of life, liberty and property." 47 Though the Court does not
say so explicitly, its explanation for the reasonable doubt standard lies in a state-
ment that false-positive errors should be avoided. The Court identifies the costs
associated with a false positive-"the possibility that he may lose his liberty...
and the certainty that he would be stigmatized by the conviction"4 8-and finds
them too great to overcome reasonable doubt. In order to minimize the risk
that a defendant will be erroneously deprived of his liberty (even though he has
been granted due process of law), the burden of proof is placed on the govern-
ment rather than the individual49 and is raised to a level that balances the de-
45. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363 (1970).
46. Id. at 364; see also Speiser, 357 U.S. at 525-26 (discussing the role of due process re-
quirements in preventing error); Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 138 (1954)
(requiring that, even in a tax case, "[t]he Government must still prove every ele-
ment of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt though not to a mathematical cer-
tainty"); Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 795 (1952) (holding that the Constitution
requires that the government has the burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt, though states have latitude to decide who has the burden of proof on ques-
tions of sanity); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 16o, 174 (1949) ("Guilt in a
criminal case must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt .... "); Wilson v. United
States, 232 U.S. 563, 569-70 (1914) (upholding jury instructions that guilt must be
established beyond a reasonable doubt); Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245, 253
(1910) (same); Davis v. United States, 16o U.S. 469, 488 (1895) (discussing the role
of the reasonable doubt requirement in light of a claim of insanity); Miles v.
United States, 103 U.S. 304, 312 (1881) ("The evidence upon which a jury is justified
in returning a verdict of guilty must be sufficient to produce a conviction of guilt,
to the exclusion of all reasonable doubt."); cf. Coffin, 156 U.S. at 457-62 (discussing
the relationship between the presumption of innocence and the requirement of
proof beyond a reasonable doubt).
47. Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 174; see also Winship, 397 U.S. at 363-64 (describing "the good
name and freedom of every individual" as "interests of immense importance"
militating against the "condemn[ation of] a man for commission of a crime when
there is reasonable doubt about his guilt").
48. Winship, 397 U.S. at 363.
49. As with the presumption of innocence discussed above, if the defendant had the
burden of proof, the risk of false positives would increase.
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fendant's interest in his liberty against the government and society's interest in
convicting the guilty.5"
Justice Harlan provided the most direct examination of the reasonable
doubt standard as an error-minimization technique in his Winship concur-
rence."1 He opined that "the choice of the standard for a particular variety of ad-
judication does, I think, reflect a very fundamental assessment of the compara-
tive social costs of erroneous factual determinations." 2 More specifically, he
explained:
The standard of proof influences the relative frequency of these two
types of erroneous outcomes [conviction of the innocent and acquittal
of the guilty]. If, for example, the standard of proof for a criminal trial
were a preponderance of the evidence rather than proof beyond a rea-
sonable doubt, there would be a smaller risk of factual errors that result
in freeing guilty persons, but a far greater risk of factual errors that re-
sult in convicting the innocent. Because the standard of proof affects
the comparative frequency of these two types of erroneous outcomes,
the choice of the standard to be applied in a particular kind of litigation
should, in a rational world, reflect an assessment of the comparative
social disutility of each.53
The United States criminal justice system is framed around the belief that "[t] he
disutility of convicting an innocent person far exceeds the disutility of finding a
guilty person to be not guilty."5 4 Thus, in criminal cases, where the life, liberty,
and reputation of the accused may be at stake, the reasonable doubt standard is
not only necessary to protect against erroneous deprivation,55 but it is also "in-
dispensable to command the respect and confidence of the community." 6
This latter point is crucial: the reasonable doubt standard and the presump-
tion of innocence protect not only the accused against erroneous deprivation,
50. If the standard were "any doubt" rather than reasonable doubt, it would likely be
virtually impossible to get a conviction. As an interesting comparison, in 2005,
Massachusetts Governor (and future unsuccessful contender for the Republican
presidential nomination) Mitt Romney advocated the adoption of a law that
would allow the death penalty in Massachusetts only in circumstance where a jury
would convict on a "no doubt" standard. Among the opposition to the bill were
those who felt the standard (and other restrictions in the bill) were "so narrow it
wouldn't cover much." Drake Bennett, Reasonable Doubt, BosToN GLOBE, May 8,
2005, at K5.
51. Winship, 397 U.S. at 369 (Harlan, J., concurring).
52. Id. at 370.
53. Id. at 371.
54. Lawrence B. Solum, You Prove It! Why Should 1?, 17 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 691,
701 (1994).
55. See Winship, 397 U.S. at 363-64; Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 16o, 174 (1949).
56. Winship, 397 U.S. at 364.
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but also the general populous against fear of the criminal courts. As the Court
put it, "[i]t is critical that the moral force of the criminal law not be diluted by a
standard of proof that leaves people in doubt whether innocent men are being
condemned."57 A standard that properly balances the interests of the accused
against the interests of the prosecution helps people have confidence that the
justice system will keep them safe not only from criminals but also from the
government. The Court explained: "It is also important in our free society that
every individual going about his ordinary affairs have confidence that his gov-
ernment cannot adjudge him guilty of a criminal offense without convincing a
proper factfinder of his guilt with utmost certainty." 8 The principle of public
confidence in the system is one to which this Note returns later in discussing
the psychosocial influence of right-to-carry laws.59
Though I have argued above that the American justice system structurally
and theoretically prioritizes false negatives over false positives, this does not
mean that Americans are satisfied in any particular case with the acquittal of a
person believed to be guilty. Indeed, particularly visible or contentious acquit-
tals, such as O.J. Simpson's, can dramatically shake the public's faith in the
criminal justice system. Commentators have noted that "[t]he O.J. Simpson
case is troublesome because it placed the criminal justice system. . . on trial
along with the accused."6" On the day the Simpson verdict was announced, the
nation stood still waiting for the jury's decision,61 and when it came down, out-
rage was widespread. The Los Angeles Times found that, after the Simpson ver-
dict, seventy percent of local residents had "only some" or "very little" confi-
dence in the criminal justice system.62
In some sense, the outrage at the Simpson verdict suggests that the public
believes that the false-positive minimization system is unsatisfactory. Here,
people were widely horrified that a man they believed to be guilty was set free
based on reasonable doubt,6 3 even if those rules are in place to protect innocent
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. See infra Part V.
6o. Christo Lassiter, The 0.1. Simpson Verdict: A Lesson in Black and White, 1 MICH. J.
RACE & L. 69, 118 (1996).
61. N.R. Kleinfield, Not Guilty: The Moment; A Day (o Minutes of It) the Country
Stood Still, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 1995, at AI.
62. Cathleen Decker, Faith in Justice System Drops, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 8, 1995, at 82; see
also Janice Nadler, Flouting the Law, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1399, 1426 (2005) (evaluating
the response of citizens to perceived injustice in the enforcement of the law);
Cathleen Decker & Sheryl Stolberg, Half of Americans Disagree with Verdict, L.A.
TIMES, Oct. 4, 1995, at Al. Nadler also calls attention to a similar response in the
wake of the acquittal of the police officers who were videotaped beating Rodney
King. Nadler, supra, at 1426.
63. See, e.g., ALAN DERSHOWITz, REASONABLE DOUBTS: THE O.1. SIMPSON CASE AND
THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (1996); Lassiter, supra note 6o, at 11o ("In the col-
582
26:567 2008
DEFENSIVE SHOOTINGS AND ERROR RISK
men from being convicted. However, the Simpson example can be explained at
least partly by the extraordinary nature of the case.64 More importantly, the
public reaction to the Simpson verdict does not undermine the greater point
that, despite fury or frustration at individual verdicts, the system works because
of its structural mechanisms for preventing errors in general and particularly
false positives.
Significantly, the reasonable doubt and presumption of innocence stan-
dards have not narrowed over time, nor do they currently appear to be narrow-
ing even in the face of public reaction to cases like Simpson's. We have not seen,
for example, the relaxation of the reasonable doubt standard to the one used in
civil cases,6" under which Simpson was found liable for the murders.66 The
courtroom side of the criminal justice system remains one that strongly prefers
false negatives to false positives, as exemplified by the presumption of inno-
cence and the reasonable doubt standard.
lective minds of the jurors, the defense proved the existence of reasonable doubt
by demonstrating two major faults with the prosecution's case."); Nadler, supra
note 62, at 1433 (noting that, for those who believed Simpson to be guilty, "there is
little solace in the prospect that the jury held reasonable doubts about the prose-
cution having proved every element of each crime-the distributive justice worry
overwhelms procedural justice concerns in this context"); Editorial, Unreasonable
Doubt. 0.1. Simpson Acquittal, NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 23, 1995, at 7.
64. O.J. Simpson's was an atypical case. Because of the fame, fortune, and particularly
the race of the accused, the trial took on a social significance above and beyond
the verdict itself. Simpson's race (and the racism demonstrated by the detectives
in the case) may be the more accurate explanation for his acquittal than reason-
able doubt, a speculation that further fuels the social controversy the trial stoked
on its own. Devon W. Carbado, The Construction of O.J. Simpson as a Racial Vic-
tim, 32 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 49, 101 (1997) ("The Simpson case came to sym-
bolize police excess and criminal injustice, and Simpson came to represent 'an-
other Black man being put down by the system."'); Linda Chavez, Race, Not
Justice, Wins Out in Verdict, USA TODAY, Oct. 4, 1995, at 15A; Michael Miller, Ana-
lysts Say Race, Not Evidence Swayed Jury, REUTERS, Oct. 3, 1995. Furthermore, be-
cause of the polarizing nature of the trial and verdict, one can imagine that public
reaction would have been similarly intense had the jury gone the other way. Para-
doxically, it is hard to find an example at such public outcry against a purportedly
erroneous conviction precisely because the system is structured to minimize such
episodes. (Of course, examples of allegedly or actually erroneous convictions
abound-one notable example is the Scottsboro Boys in the 193os. See DAN T.
CARTER, SCOTTSBORO: A TRAGEDY OF THE AMERICAN SOUTH (1979)).
65. The standard in civil cases is generally "preponderance of the evidence," which
has been understood to mean greater than fifty percent or, in other words, more
likely than not. See Emily L. Sherwin & Kevin M. Clermont, A Comparative View
of Standards of Proof, 50 AM. J. COMP. LAW 243 (2002).
66. Stephanie Simon, Simpson Liable in Slayings; Compensatory Damages Put at $8.5
Million, L.A. TIMEs, Feb. 5, 1997, at Ai.
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Of course, it is possible that increasingly permissive self-defense laws, de-
scribed below, are themselves the structural response to public dissatisfaction
with the false-positive-minimizing courtroom protections. As the next Section
describes, self-defense laws demonstrate a societal conclusion that there is more
social utility to allowing false positives than prioritizing false negatives when the
imminent bodily harm of an innocent person is at stake.
IV. FALSE-NEGATIVE MINIMIZATION: SELF-DEFENSE LAWS
Self-defense laws have the opposite error-risk prioritizations from the pre-
sumption of innocence and reasonable doubt rules; self-defense laws minimize
false negatives by tolerating some false positives. While a comprehensive ex-
amination of self-defense rules is beyond the scope of this Note, a brief over-
view will suffice to understand the way self-defense plays into the error-risk pic-
ture painted above.6 7 This Part summarizes the self-defense rules, and then
turns to a discussion of the error-risk prioritizations of self-defense law.
Self-defense carves out an exception to the general rules that people are not
allowed to use force against one another. Wayne LaFave provides a simple and
concise summary of the law of self-defense in criminal law:
One who is not the aggressor in an encounter is justified in using a rea-
sonable amount of force against his adversary when he reasonably be-
lieves (a) that he is in immediate danger of unlawful bodily harm from
his adversary and (b) that the use of such force is necessary to avoid
this danger.68
67. At the outset, it is important to note that the rule of self-defense in both criminal
and tort law is a rule that is defined by each state. See, e.g., Martin v. Ohio, 480
U.S. 228, 230 (1987) (deferring to Ohio courts and Code definition of self-defense).
Accordingly, it can vary by jurisdiction. All discussion in this Part, then, is gen-
eral-a survey of the various interstate nuances in self-defense law is neither pos-
sible nor necessary in this Note.
68. 2 LAFAVE, supra note 27, § 10.4. For more on self-defense, see generally MODEL
PENAL CODE § 3.04 cmt. (1985); A.J. Ashworth, Self-Defence and the Right to Life,
34 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 282 (1975); Joseph H. Beale, Homicide in Self-Defence, 3
COLUM. L. REV. 526 (1903); Joseph H. Beale, Retreat from a Murderous Assault, 16
HARV. L. REV. 567 (1903) (discussing early American doctrine on the duty to re-
treat); Claire Oakes Finkelstein, On the Obligation of the State to Extend a Right of
Self-Defense to Its Citizens, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 1361 (1999); Rollin M. Perkins, Self-
Defense Re-examined, i UCLA L. REV. 133 (1954). The availability of self-defense as
a justification for the torts of assault and battery is based on the same principle as
the availability of self-defense as a justification in criminal law: the defense in both
cases exempts the defendant from liability to which he otherwise might be subject
on the ground that his use of force to defend himself should be legally permissi-
ble. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 63, 65, 67 (1965); WILLIAM LLOYD
PROSSER & W. PAGE. KEETON, TORTS § 19 (5 th ed. 1984).
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This rule applies to all force and all threats, as long as the two are propor-
tional.6 9 In the context of gun use, the force is often deadly force. In these cir-
cumstances, the proportionality rule is especially strict (at least in the abstract);
it is generally impermissible to use deadly force to defend against non-deadly
threats,7° except to protect one's home (or "castle"),' or to effect a "lawful ar-
rest." 72 Similarly, the Model Penal Code prohibits the use of deadly force where
"the actor knows that he can avoid the necessity of using such force with com-
plete safety by retreating" 3 with the exception that no one is "obliged to retreat
from his dwelling or place of work."
7 4
So how exactly does the rule of self-defense play into error risk calculus?
Just as in the criminal prosecution scenario discussed above, the decision to use
self-defense necessarily involves the risk that the decision-maker will be wrong
about the facts.75 In the courtroom scenario, the zero-one decision is convict or
acquit; in a self-defense situation, the zero-one decision is defend (with force)
or do not. In the courtroom, a false-positive error occurs when an innocent
man is convicted; in cases of self-defense, a false-positive error occurs when a
self-defender erroneously assumes that another person poses an imminent dan-
ger and uses force against the perceived attacker. Conversely, in the courtroom,
a false-negative error is the acquittal of a guilty man. With self-defense, a false-
negative error is the erroneous perception by a self-defender that he is not in
imminent danger, resulting in a failure to defend himself and causing him seri-
ous or even deadly harm.
69. Self-defense is also a privilege in tort law and is defined similarly. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 65 (1965).
70. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW § 10.4 (4th ed. 2003) ("It is never reason-
able to use deadly force against his nondeadly attack.").
71. The "Castle Doctrine" was first defined in Pell v. State, 122 So. 11o, 116 (Fla. 1929).
For more on the Castle Doctrine, see notes 103-1o6 and accompanying text.
72. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(2)(A)(ii)(a) (1985) (permitting the use of force if "the
actor is a public officer acting in the performance of his duties or a person law-
fully assisting him therein or a person making or assisting in a lawful arrest").
73. Id. § 3.04(2)(B)(ii).
74. Id. § 3.o4(2)(B)(ii)(a). There are signs, however, that the duty to retreat is fading
from our criminal justice system. Despite incorporation in the Model Penal Code,
it is the rule only in a minority of jurisdictions, and a least one commentator has
suggested that "the retreat rule seems likely to wither." George Dix, Justification:
Self-Defense, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND JUSTICE 948-49 (Sanford H. Kadish
ed., 3d ed. 1983); see also LAFAVE, supra note 70, § 10.4 ("There is a dispute as to
whether one threatened with a deadly attack must retreat, if he can safely do so,
before resorting to deadly force, except that it is agreed that ordinarily he need not
retreat from his home or place of business.").
75. Cf In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 370 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) ("[The trier of
fact will sometimes, despite his best efforts, be wrong in his factual conclusions.").
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A self-defense rule that prefers false-negative to false-positive errors (such
as the type of rule that operates in the courtroom) would give self-defenders
very little latitude to make mistakes; self-defense would be justified only when
the self-defender could be certain (say, beyond a reasonable doubt) that he
needed to use deadly force to protect himself or his home. A rule that prefers
false-positive over false-negative errors, however, would give a self-defender a
great deal of latitude to make errors. Either way, self-defense law is significantly
more tolerant of false-positive errors than are the courtrooms. The error toler-
ance the law countenances in this arena can be observed in two ways: through
the reliance on the reasonable belief of the self-defender and through the bur-
den of proof to establish the defense.
The standard for evaluating decisions to use deadly force in self-defense is
not whether the decision was correct, but merely whether it was reasonable. 6
Self-defense is composed of four elements: imminence, necessity, proportional-
ity, and intention to thwart an attack. 7 Governing all of these parts, however, is
the self-defender's reasonable belief in each.78 The notion of reasonableness is in
tension with the idea that for any given situation there is an underlying truth
(that is identifiable). 79 Reasonableness is at play in the general courtroom situa-
tion discussed above;"o in that scenario, it cuts in favor of false negatives-the
reasonable doubt standard protecting against erroneous convictions-but in
the self-defense scenario, it cuts in favor of false positives-reasonableness gives
a self-defender latitude to be wrong in his assessment of a situation.sl Drawing
on the Hattori example from earlier,"2 it was at least arguably reasonable for Mr.
Peairs to believe his life and home were in danger and that deadly force was
76. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(1), (2)(B) (asserting that the use of force, in-
cluding deadly force, is only justifiable when "the actor believes that such force is
immediately necessary to protect himself'). Some states make the flexibility pro-
vided by the reasonableness requirement more explicit, excusing force even where
the actor's "belief is mistaken," which translates to a test of reasonableness. See,
e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-05-08; State v. Leidholm, 334 N.W.2d 811 (N.D. 1983).
77. GEORGE P. FLETCHER, A CRIME OF SELF DEFENSE: BERNHARD GOETZ AND THE
LAW ON TRIAl 19-27 (1988); see also Kenneth W. Simons, Self-Defense, Mens Rea,
and Bernhard Goetz, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1179, n81 (1989) (book review).
78. Mesa v. California, 489 U.S. 121, 127 (1989) ("The successful legal defense of 'self-
defense' depends on the truth of two distinct elements: that the act committed
was, in a legal sense, an act of self-defense, and that the act was justified, that is,
warranted under the circumstances.").
79. See FLETCHER, supra note 77, at 39-41 ("Reasonableness... distinguishes Ameri-
cans from our European brethren, who are still committed, at least nominally, to
the singular truth of the law as the Right and the True.").
80. See supra Part III.
81. Of course, this inverse makes sense; in both ways, the reasonableness standard
cuts in favor of the criminal defendant.
82. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
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necessary to protect them. Thus, even though we know, ex post, that Mr. Peairs
was wrong in his assessment, the requirement of reasonableness allows his de-
fensive actions to be justified based on his own perceptions.
There are two tests for the reasonableness of a self-defender's use of deadly
force: objective (what a reasonable person would believe) and subjective (what
the particular self-defender believed).3 The choice of whether to use an objec-
tive or subjective test has great consequence for considering error tolerance.
The subjective test is distinctly more tolerant of error on the part of the self-
defender than is the objective test. In fact, the choice of test can be seen as the
result, rather than the source, of the error-tolerance level:
In self-defense law, the choice has often been framed in terms of mis-
take: If a defendant makes an honest mistake in believing that he is be-
ing unlawfully attacked, is he nevertheless entitled to use defensive
force? If the answer is an unqualified "yes," the law adopts a subjective
test. If the answer is a qualified "yes"-specifically, if his honest mis-
take must be "reasonable" in order to provide a defense-then the law
adopts an objective test.
s4
This question can be reframed through the lens of error tolerance: is the benefit
of individuals being able to protect themselves greater than the cost of mistaken
defenses? If the answer is yes, the test will be subjective. If it is no, or a qualified
yes, the test will be objective.
Nonetheless, the objective test is not wholly immune to false positives ei-
ther. First, even the objective test has elements of subjectivity that allow room
for mistakes. Even a "reasonable man" can make an incorrect assessment of
danger, imminence, necessity, or proportionality-the four evaluations re-
quired for a successful self-defense argument. Thus, even the most strict stan-
dard (the objective reasonableness standard) leaves a good deal of room for
false positives (and accordingly very little room for false negatives).
Another way to view the error tolerance in a self-defense context is through
the burden placed on the self-defender who uses self-defense to defeat liability.
Generally, self-defense is an affirmative defense to both civil and criminal
charges, which means that the defendant must assert and prove he acted in self-
defense in order for his actions to be legally justified" self-defense. The Su-
83. See State v. Leidholm, 334 N.W.2d 811 (N.D. 1983) (discussing the difference be-
tween objective and subjective standards in self-defense cases); FLETCHER, supra
note 77, at 41-43 (discussing the difference between the objective and subjective
standards and tracing the history of each in the New York courts). One commen-
tator reasonably asks whether even an objective test is actually objective: "Should
the jury examine whether a reasonable person who has been victimized before
would react as [the self-defender] did? If they should, what should they con-
sider? ... At what point does the 'reasonable crime victim' become a 'reasonable
paranoid' who does not deserve a defense?" Simons, supra note 77, at 1189.
84. Simons, supra note 77, at 1185-86.
85. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 63, 65 (1965); 1 LAFAVE, supra note 27,
§ 3.4(e).
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preme Court has not defined the minimum burden acceptable for a defendant
to establish that she acted in self-defense, but it has set a ceiling: an instruction
that "self-defense evidence" must "satisf[y] the preponderance standard" would
be unconstitutional. 6 In other words, the defendant need not prove by greater
than fifty-percent that his actions met the self-defense requirement; an accept-
able standard must be some amount less than that. The lower the burden on the
defendant to prove self-defense, the more society can be understood to value
self-defense as a justification and accept the errors that come with it.
Indeed, the logic behind the self-defense rule is that there is a social benefit
to allowing individuals to defend themselves against attack. As LaFave explains,
it is "only just" for people to be able to use force to defend themselves against
attack."s He writes, "if A killed B to prevent B from killing him, then the defense
of self-defense comes into play because the purposes of the criminal law are bet-
ter served by A's acquittal."88 Professor Paul Robinson puts it slightly differ-
ently, describing the justification for defensive force in a way that sounds re-
markably consistent with a false-positive-minimization regime: "One may even
permit the killing of three attacking thugs to save one innocent person, though
the harm caused is clearly greater, because society highly values the protection
of innocents and deplores unjustified aggression."8 9 The breadth of self-defense
rules, and their universality, make clear that the principles behind the right to
self-defense are as deeply ingrained in the American psyche as are false-
negative-preference regimes of reasonable doubt and presumption of inno-
cence, creating a tension between the two.
Thus far, this Note has reviewed two different legal scenarios and the corre-
sponding error preference. In the courtroom, false-negative errors are pre-
ferred, and in situations of self-defense, the law favors false-positive errors.
These two legal situations are in direct tension, which can be understood in two
ways. First, this tension is not necessarily problematic. Indeed, it can be viewed
as a balance, each side of which is necessary to keep the other in check. Too
great a preference for false negatives (in the courtroom) would leave crime vic-
tims insufficiently protected; too great a preference for false positives (in indi-
vidual uses of self-defense) would leave perceived criminals insufficiently pro-
tected. When gun laws change to become more restrictive or, as we have more
commonly seen recently, more permissive, this balance shifts. That shift should
be the focus of analytical inquiry; instead of merely examining how crime rates
change in response to changing gun laws, policy-makers should consider
whether pushing towards a false-positive-prioritizing regime with the passage of
more permissive gun laws is helpful or harmful to society.
86. Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228, 233-34 (1987) (citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364
(1970)).
87. 2 LAFAVE, supra note 27, § 10.4(a).
88. Id. § 7.1(b).
89. PAUL ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW DEFENSES 69-73 (1984).
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Second, though self-defense rules favor false positives, they still require an
affirmative ex-post showing in a court of law that the use of self-defense by a
defendant was justified. There the self-defense rules will be put in direct tension
with the reasonable doubt and presumption of innocence rules. The fact that
self-defense protections operate only ex post mitigates their false-positive-
prioritization effects; a self-defender might fail to use a gun, reasonably and le-
gally, for fear that the false-positive-prevention mechanisms of the court system
that may later judge her will fail. The very nature of self-defense, with its re-
quirement of imminent harm, means that it is impossible to make ex-ante ad-
judications of whether a self-defender's decision will grant her legal immunity
under the self-defense doctrine.
So while the American system, from a structural perspective, clearly con-
templates defensive gun use, and its attendant false-positive preference, it often
requires the decision to take a false-positive error risk (shooting in self-defense)
to be justified ex post in court. The passage of permissive gun laws, including
right-to-carry laws, would seem to imply an acceptance (or even an encour-
agement) of more frequent legally justified defensive gun use,90 and, accord-
ingly, of false-positive-preference decisions. Although ex-post rationalizations
may still be necessary, potentially minimizing the magnitude of this shift, the
shift remains nonetheless.
V. LOCATING GUN LAWS IN ERROR-PREFERENCE MODELS
With the general error-tolerance landscape of the law laid out, I now turn
to considering how private ownership of guns fits into this picture and affects
the balance of error risk. This Part will first examine the state of gun laws in
America, revealing a wide and growing acceptance of the use of guns in self-
defense, which indicates a growing tolerance for false positives. This Part then
examines the implications of that shift, and how one might contextualize social
responses, by addressing the social implications of expanding the use of self-
defense. Finally, it considers the expected societal response to this shift and
whether there is a moral imperative to use either a false-positive- or false-
negative-minimizing system.
9o. The change in justified defensive gun uses might be measured empirically-do
defensive gun uses increase in states with RTC laws? No statistical evidence could
be found on this point, but it is hard to imagine the answer could be anything
other than yes. Another interesting question that might be harder to answer em-
pirically is whether the defense of self-defense is more successfully used to achieve
acquittal or avoid charges entirely in right-to-carry states.
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A. Changing Gun Laws
Americans are allowed to keep their guns-or prohibited from doing so-
mostly according to a variety of state (rather than federal) restrictions. 9' There
are four broad categories of state gun control laws: bans on certain firearms;
sales and purchase restrictions; sentence enhancement laws; and possession re-
strictions. 92 For consideration of defensive gun uses, it is the last category that is
most relevant, because possession restrictions bear directly upon the ability of
citizens to carry weapons for self-defense under the law. Possession restrictions
are what expand the circumstances and opportunities for the exercise of the
false-positive-preferring self-defense doctrine discussed above. This choice can
be understood to be at the expense of the use of the false-negative-preferring
criminal justice system, because a potential criminal who is shot and killed by a
self-defender is not going to be arrested, tried, and have his guilt adjudicated in
a court of law.
Only two states-Vermont and Alaska-do not require an individual to
have a permit to carry a concealed weapon.93 Every other state has laws that are
referred to variously as "concealed-carry" and "right-to-carry" (RTC) laws.
Thirty-six states can be characterized as "shall-issue" concealed-carry states,
94
because their law maintains that most individuals, with a few objective limits,
shall be issued a concealed-carry permit upon application. 95 There are also
91. Federal law does have a major role to play in gun rights. Two major federal laws-
the ban on felons carrying guns, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2000), and the ban on ju-
venile gun possession, 18 U.S.C. § 922(x) (20oo)-affect millions of Americans. In
addition, federal law prohibits gun possession by those under felony indictment,
18 U.S.C. § 922(n) (2000); anyone convicted in any court of even misdemeanor
domestic violence, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) (2000); drug addicts, 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(3) (2000); and other categories of people. In addition, federal law regu-
lates various aspects of the sale and transfer of firearms. See Nat'l Rifle Ass'n, A
Citizen's Guide to Federal Firearms Laws, http://www.nraila.org/GunLaws/Feder
al/Read.aspx?id=6o (last visited Mar. 5, 2008). Until recently, federal law also
banned Assault Weapons, 18 U.S.C. § 922(v), (w) (2000), but that prohibition
lapsed in 2004. Nonetheless, for the category of those legally eligible to possess
firearms under federal law, states are the source of the vast majority of regulations
concerning how and where those guns may be carried.
92. Jon S. Vernick & Lisa M. Hepburn, State and Federal Gun Laws: Trends for 197o-
99, in EVALUATING GUN POLICY, supra note 5, at 345, 353. Vernick and Hepburn's
analysis of guns laws has been called "[t]he best scholarly presentation and analy-
sis of recent state gun laws." Carter, supra note 12, at 167.
93. Nat'l Rifle Ass'n, supra note 20. Before 2003, Vermont was the only non-permit
state. Vernick & Hepburn, supra note 92, at 345, tbl.9A-5.
94. Nat'l Rifle Ass'n, supra note 20.
95. Vernick & Hepburn, supra note 92, at 357. These states are Arizona, Arkansas,
Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine,
Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New
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"may-issue" states, in which permit applicants must demonstrate good cause
for their permit before it is approved.96 Eleven states have these discretionary
permits of varying degrees of restrictiveness. 97 Finally, two states make it impos-
sible or nearly impossible to receive concealed-carry permits. 9s
These numbers are significant on their own; more than two-thirds of
American states will issue concealed-carry permits to almost anyone who wants
them. The numbers become more significant as part of a trend, however. Con-
cealed-carry laws began in the United States in the 1920s and 1930s; before that,
states either banned concealed weapons entirely or permitted them freely.99 The
new laws states enacted were based largely on a model law that prohibited unli-
censed concealed carrying.0 0 By 2003, twenty-one states had passed more re-
strictive concealed-carry laws, either discretionary permitting or flat-out prohi-
bitions on concealed carrying. 1 ' Since 2003, however, this trend has reversed:
eight states have either enacted RTC laws or adjusted their may-issue laws to
become shall issue. °2
Hampshire, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington,
West Virginia, and Wyoming. Alaska is also included in this number because it
has a shall-issue requirement for purposes of reciprocity with other states. Nat'l
Rifle Ass'n, supra note 20. Vernick and Hepburn place the number of shall-issue
states at twenty-eight, not including the non-permit state Vermont (before Alaska
passed its no-permit law in 2003). Vernick & Hepburn, supra note 92, at 345,
tbl.9 A- 5. The difference can be accounted for by new laws (or different characteri-
zations of existing laws) in Colorado, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska,
New Mexico, and Ohio. Right-to-carry laws were passed in Kansas and Nebraska
in 2006; in Ohio in 2004; and in Colorado, Minnesota, New Mexico, and Missouri
in 2003. Nat'l Rifle Ass'n, supra note 20.
96. Vernick & Hepburn, supra note 92, at 357.
97. Nat'l Rifle Ass'n, supra note 2o. These states are Alabama, California, Connecti-
cut, Delaware, Hawaii, Iowa, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York,
and Rhode Island. Id. Again, Vernick and Hepburn put a different number of
states-fourteen-in this category, because of new laws (or different characteriza-
tions of existing laws) in Colorado, Michigan, and Minnesota. Vernick & Hep-
burn, supra note 92, at 345, tbl.9A-5.
98. Nat'l Rifle Ass'n, supra note 20. These states are Illinois and Wisconsin. Id.
99. Clayton E. Kramer & David B. Kopel, "Shall Issue": The New Wave of Concealed
Handgun Permit Laws, 62 TENN. L. REV. 679, 681 (1995).
loo. Id.
lO1. Vernick & Hepburn, supra note 92, at 345, 357, tbl.9A-5.
102. These states include Colorado (moving away from its previous "restrictively-
administered discretionary-issue system[]"), Kansas, Iowa ("by fairly administer-
ing its discretionary-issue system"), Ohio, Minnesota (moving away from its pre-
vious "restrictively-administered discretionary-issue system[]"), Missouri, Ne-
braska, and New Mexico. Nat'l Rifle Ass'n, supra note 20.
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If more people are being allowed to carry concealed weapons, then more
people have the opportunity to shoot in self-defense. Though any individual
shooting is not more or less likely to be erroneous, the greater frequency of de-
fensive shootings that RTC laws allows means that there will be a greater total
number of errors (even if the rate of error remains the same). Thus, the move-
ment in favor of RTC laws, at least in theory, creates more opportunities for
false-negative-minimizing defensive shootings.
Equally important, though less prevalent than RTC laws, is an expansion of
the Castle Doctrine. Historically, the Castle Doctrine suspends the duty to re-
treat and permits the use of deadly force to protect one's home. °3 However, the
new NRA-backed Castle Doctrine legislation expands this exception to include
places other than one's home; indeed, to any place one is legally entitled to be.
The NRA describes its the legislation as follows:
Castle Doctrine, in essence, simply places into law what is a fundamen-
tal right: self-defense. If a person is in a place he or she has a right to
be-in the front yard, on the road, working in their office, strolling in
the park-and is confronted by an armed predator, he or she can re-
spond in force in defense of their lives. Castle Doctrine also protects
the law-abiding from criminal and civil charges for defending them-
selves against an attacker whereby, after enduring the trauma of a vio-
lent attack, they aren't again tied to the tracks of a drawn-out, night-
marish legal battle that could derail their financial future.
1 4
In April 2005, Florida became the first state to enact this new Castle Doctrine
into law.105 In the following year and a half, eight other states-Alabama, Ari-
zona, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Kentucky, Mississippi, and South Dakota-
followed suit.1" 6 On September 1, 2007, a particularly strong law, extending Cas-
tle-Doctrine protection to vehicles and workplaces, went into effect in Texas.1
°7
The Castle Doctrine is a particularly important barometer for measuring error
tolerance, because, by permitting (or even encouraging) increased defensive
gun use, it strongly favors the false-positive side of the error-risk balance.
As noted in Part II, in courtroom adjudications of guilt or innocence, the
law favors false negatives, but in the self-defense context the preference is for
false positives. By generating more and more circumstances in which individu-
103. See supra note 71 for further reference to the Castle Doctrine.
104. Nat'l Rifle Ass'n, This Train Keeps a Rollin'; Castle Doctrine Sweeps America,
http://www.nraila.org//Issues/Articles/Read.aspx?ID=199 (last visited Mar. io,
2008).
105. Abby Goudnough, Florida Expands Right to Use Deadly Force in Self-Defense, N.Y.
Times, Apr. 27, 2005, at A18.
1o6. Nat'l Rifle Ass'n, supra note 104.
107. See Press Release, Office of Tex. Gov. Rick Perry, Gov. Perry Signs Law Allowing
Texans To Protect Themselves (Mar. 27, 2007), http://www.governor.
state.tx.us/divisions/presspressreleases/PressRelease.2007-o3-27.o6ol.
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als are allowed to, in a moment, adjudicate guilt and innocence, the increasing
number of shall-issue RTC laws and particularly the emergence of the expanded
Castle Doctrine shifts the burden of law enforcement from the government to
the individual, deputizing private citizens. In so doing, these legislative changes
add significant weight to the false-positive-preferring side of the error-risk bal-
ance.
B. Implications of Changing Gun Laws
In addition to broadening the category of shootings that are considered le-
gal, more permissive gun laws have a number of other implications, both prac-
tical and theoretical. The shift in the laws may create a negative feedback cycle
of confidence in the police. It also may lead to an increase in vigilante justice.
Finally, it may signal a moral conclusion about the relative value of different er-
ror risks when human life is on the line. Each of these possible consequences is
discussed in turn.
First, the shift toward legalizing defensive gun use may create a self-
reinforcing effect of weakening confidence in the power of government as a law
enforcement agency: we do not have confidence in the police, so we need to
protect ourselves; because we are protecting ourselves, the role of the police
(and therefore our confidence in them) diminishes. The cycle self-perpetuates.
The notion that personal possession of firearms may shift attitudes about law
enforcement is not novel. In 1932, one homicide scholar stated that "the posses-
sion of firearms gives a false sense of security and encourages recklessness and
arrogance." ' The sense of security lulls people into thinking formal law en-
forcement is unnecessary, while the attendant recklessness underscores the need
for it.
Lack of confidence in the ability of the police to stop crimes is often used as
a justification for RTC laws and the use of guns in self-defense. This is rarely
framed as abject mistrust of the police; instead, it is argued that the lack of con-
fidence stems from the pragmatic notion that even the best equipped and most
well-intentioned police cannot stop crimes in progress. Gary Kleck argues, for
instance, that the idea "that citizens can depend on police for effective protec-
tion" is "simply untrue."'0 9 He elaborates:
It implies that police can serve the same function as a gun in disrupting
a crime in progress, before the victim is hurt or loses property. Police
cannot do this, and indeed do not themselves even claim to be able to
do so. Instead, police primarily respond reactively to crimes after they
have occurred, questioning the victim and other witnesses in the hope
that they can apprehend the criminals, make them available for prose-
1O8. H.C. BREARLEY, HOMICIDE IN THE UNITED STATES 76 (1932).
109. Kleck, Keeping, Carrying, and Shooting Guns for Self-Protection, supra note 6, at
207.
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cution and punishment, and thereby deter other criminals from at-
tempting crimes.'
The argument that people should be allowed to carry guns because of the in-
ability of police to stop crimes in progress was raised immediately and vocifer-
ously after the tragic shootings at Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State Uni-
versity on April 16, 2007.
When a disturbed student at Virginia Tech went on a violent rampage, kill-
ing thirty-two people before turning the gun on himself,"' advocates of gun
rights immediately cited the massacre as evidence that individuals should more
readily be allowed to carry guns to defend themselves. Ted Nugent, a member
of the National Rifle Association's board of directors, made an impassioned
plea for restrictive gun laws to be abandoned in the wake of the Virginia Tech
shootings:
Embrace the facts, demand upgrade and be certain that your children's
school has a better plan than Virginia Tech or Columbine. Eliminate
the insanity of gun-free zones, which will never, ever be gun-free zones.
They will only be good guy gun-free zones, and that is a recipe for dis-
aster written in blood on the altar of denial."2
At least one legislative initiative picked up on Nugent's plea: Texas Governor
Rick Perry proposed, in the wake of the Virginia Tech shootings, that all li-
censed gun owners be allowed to carry weapons on their persons (in other
words, carry concealed weapons) rather than just keeping them in their
homes."' The argument is that even if the police cannot get there in time,
"brave, average, armed citizens [can] neutralize" a lunatic gunman and thus
save innocent lives."1
4
Situations like Virginia Tech provide compelling examples in which it is
hard to imagine a defensive shooting being in error. But most situations in
which individuals experience themselves to be under threat are not as cut and
dry as Virginia Tech; consider again the example of the Japanese exchange stu-
dent at the beginning of this Note. All defensive shootings bear some measure
of risk that a person will be shot erroneously; the question that is important
from a policy perspective is whether society believes lay citizens or law-
enforcement agents are in a better position to make this decision. One ration-
alization for RTC laws might be that allowing more defensive shootings by citi-
110. Id. at 207-08.
in1. John M. Broder, 32 Shot Dead in Virginia; Worst U.S. Gun Rampage: Suspect Is
Killed, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 2007, at Al.
112. Ted Nugent, Gun-Free Zones Are Recipe for Disaster, CNN.coM, Apr. 20, 2007,
http://www.cnn.com/2007/US/o4/19/commentary.nugent/index.html.
113. Jay Root, Allow Concealed Handguns Anywhere in Texas, FT. WORTH STAR-
TELEGRAM, May 1, 2007, at Bi.
114. Nugent, supra note 112.
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zens (and therefore proportionally fewer by police) will result in fewer overall
errors.
Indeed, some gun rights advocates cite police incompetence as a reason for
the passage of RTC laws in a way that echoes this Note's error-risk framework
without invoking it explicitly. For example, in his argument for why individuals
should be armed, Lott notes that "police accidentally kill as many as 330 inno-
cent individuals annually.""' 5
Police errors are important in the risk calculus-indeed, decisions by police
officers to shoot (or not to shoot) suspects are subject to similar high false-
positive-error risk as civilian defensive shooting decisions. High-profile cases of
erroneous (but not criminal) police shootings regularly make headlines; take,
for example, the case of Amadou Diallo in New York."6 These errors make less
compelling the notion that RTC laws, and citizen defensive shootings, cause an
overall net increase in the number of erroneous shootings. Still, police shoot-
ings are different from civilian shootings in many important ways: space does
not permit a thorough discussion of the distinction, but, at a minimum, it is
significant to note that police make their decisions within the regulated, moni-
tored confines of the criminal justice system, and are subject to extensive train-
ing, supervision, and detailed rules about the use of weapons.
The sense that police are inadequate to protect American citizens is also
important in the discussion of self-defense because it further blurs the already
fuzzy line between self-defense and vigilantism. Generally, defensive gun use
can be "distinguished from other forms of forceful activity directed at criminals,
such as vigilantism, or activities of the criminal justice system ... such as police
making arrests""' 7 or police shootings. Although all "can be coercive" and "may
be done by armed persons," there is a significant characteristic of vigilantism in
the criminal justice system that is (theoretically) absent from self-defense: the
pursuit of ex-post justice rather than ex-ante prevention."' Nonetheless, there
are, as Kleck notes, "some parallels." Historically, "[vligilantism, in the true
sense of collective private force used for social control purposes, flourished
where legal controls were weakest, such as frontier areas."" 9 Today, where the
police force is viewed as inadequate for "social control purposes," self-defense
fills in the gap. Indeed, Kleck acknowledges, "[t]he late twentieth century sub-
115. LOTT, supra note 12, at 1-2.
116. See Jane Fritsch, The Diallo Verdict: The Overview; 4 Officers in Diallo Shooting Are
Acquitted of All Charges, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 2000, at Ai. In another ongoing con-
troversy, New York police officers shot a man named Sean Bell in 2006; whether
that shooting was legally justified remains a subject of controversy. Dianne Card-
well & Sewell Chan, Bloomberg Calls 50 Shots by Police "Unacceptable," N.Y. TIMES,
NOV. 28, 2006, at Ai.
117. Kleck, The Frequency of Defensive Gun Use, supra note 5, at 152.
118. Id.
119. Kleck, The Nature of Defensive Gun Use, supra note 4, at 252.
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stitute for vigilantism is individualistic resistance to criminals by those directly
victimized."12
The result may be that situations previously characterized as vigilantism
will now, under more permissive RTC laws and particularly where the standard
for self-defense is subjective, be considered legitimate self-defense. This bears
on the error-risk calculus in two ways. First, it increases in raw numbers the
opportunities for citizen shootings and the attendant false-positive-error pref-
erences. Second, the increased room for permissible vigilante activity suggests a
systematic shift in whom we as a society trust to keep us safe-fellow citizens or
the government. When we pick the latter, we tend to impose the false-positive-
minimizing rules; more opportunities for defense that borders on vigilantism
puts weight on the false-negative-minimizing side of the scale. This vigilante ef-
fect can be viewed as the other side of the closely-related concept of decreasing
confidence in law enforcement.
Though this Note intends to be non-normative in its analysis, it would be
remiss not to consider the moral implications of shifting to a system that in-
creasingly tolerates false positives through increasingly permissive gun laws. It is
hard to avoid the moral undertones of the n guilty men analysis discussed
above;'2' the suggestion for any n ratio is that taking the life of an innocent per-
son is morally unacceptable (by varying degrees). Accordingly, it might be mor-
ally indefensible to shift away from a false-positive-minimization system by
passing more permissive gun laws.
Still, a strong argument can be made that permissive gun laws (and other
false-positive tolerating systems) are not only morally acceptable but actually
morally required if the false positives that result (erroneous defensive shoot-
ings) cause an overall reduction in the taking of innocent lives. Professors Cass
R. Sunstein and Adrian Vermeule recently made this argument in the context of
capital punishment.122 They argue that if capital punishment can be statistically
shown to deter future crime,123 it is the moral responsibility of society to use it.
Their moral argument can easily be applied to the gun control debate specifi-
cally with respect to deterrence, but it also bears weight as a broader response to
false-positive minimization.
On the one hand, Sunstein and Vermeule's argument can be seen as a refu-
tation of a false-positive-minimization philosophy. If any particular mechanism
of justice, be it capital punishment or the increased opportunity for legally justi-
fied defensive shootings, trades the deprivation of one individual for the preser-
120. Id. at 252-53.
2l1. See supra notes 35-40 and accompanying text.
122. Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 18, at 705.
123. The impetus for Sunstein and Vermeule's argument is, among other studies, a na-
tional survey that suggests that each execution may prevent some eighteen addi-
tional murders. Id. at 706 (citing Hashem Dezhbakhsh et al., Does Capital Pun-
ishment Have a Deterrent Effect? New Evidence from Postmoratorium Panel Data, 5
AM. L. & EcON. REV. 344 (2003)).
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vation of more than one other, it should be morally required, false positives
notwithstanding. To the extent that self-defense laws have a deterrent effect, '24
they seem eminently consistent with the Sunstein and Vermeule moral obliga-
tion theory discussed above.
Though the moral obligation theory can thus be seen as supporting the
false-negative-minimizing self-defense system, it can also be seen to be consis-
tent with a false-positive-minimization system. Sunstein and Vermeule's argu-
ment can be characterized as suggesting that society look not at the risk of a
false positive in each individual case but rather at the risk of error in society as a
statistical whole. If each defensive shooting saves numerous other innocent lives
(which would be taken in error through crime), then a true false-positive-
minimization system might prefer erroneous deprivation of a single individual
(by shooting someone who is not committing a crime and thus depriving him
of his life or health) to limit the number of false positives made on the whole.
Either way, the Sunstein and Vermeule argument provides a strong counter-
weight to any suggestion that it is morally necessary to minimize false positives
by relying on the criminal justice system to keep us safe rather than permitting
self-defense.
CONCLUSION
This Note has attempted to put a new theoretical twist on a topic of fervent
academic and political debate: the implication of any connection between gun
laws and crime rates. Rather than merely looking at the correlative relationship
between gun laws and crime, I suggest the implications that permissive gun laws
have on error risk must be considered. This argument is not empirical but
rather theoretical (and perhaps moral). While empirical analysis of this subject
might be possible, it would be extremely difficult. More importantly, empirics
are not necessary to prove the point I make: the justice system can be framed as
a balance of error risk that is based on a social evaluation of the "comparative
social disutility '25 of false positives and false negatives in different contexts. So-
cial disutility is measured not by the rate of the errors but rather by the cost of
each error to society. Though the assessment of cost might be measured empiri-
cally, decisions about cost tend to be made by courts on the basis of moral value
judgments. My argument here is that the value judgment about the cost of an
erroneous defensive shooting must become a part of the conversation about
RTC and other gun laws.
If it were possible to make an empirical assessment of cost, in the end, the
debate may be exactly the deontological type that Sunstein and Vermeule de-
scribe with respect to capital punishment.126 Here the question would be
whether the moral arguments underpinning self-defense rules (the moral pro-
124. See supra notes 14-23 and accompanying text.
125. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 371 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
126. Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 18, at 707, 737-40.
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priety of protecting oneself and others and the general deterrent effect) trump
any statistical proof that more or greater harm results from permitting indi-
viduals to engage in that defense. Sunstein and Vermeule suggest that whichever
regime results in fewest number of deaths is "morally obligatory."7 At the very
least, the question is one of democratic policy preference.
This is significant because discussions of gun policy are not merely aca-
demic, and currently the policy overemphasizes crime rates as the only signifi-
cant standard of analysis. As "[p]olicymakers, voters, and the courts... decide
the appropriate trade-off between safety, on the one hand, and public expendi-
ture and imposition, on the other,'12 they rely on "fundamental assumptions"
about "whether reducing the number of guns in private hands would lead to
more or less violent crime."'2 9 Instead, they should also be considering the con-
sequences of the error-risk shift, so that the cost-benefit trade-offs and the
moral implications they create become conscious policy decisions rather than
collateral effects. Specifically, policy-makers should consider the impact of in-
creasingly permissive gun laws on the risk of erroneous defensive shootings and
how that risk plays into not only the moral equation but also public confidence
in the justice system and in law enforcement.
Discussions over gun policy are likely to get even more heated as the Su-
preme Court considers the scope of the Second Amendment for the first time in
sixty-eight years. 13° The Court will consider the appeal of District of Columbia v.
Heller,13' in which the D.C. Circuit relied in part on the Second Amendment's
premise that guns would be kept by citizens for "self-defense, .... understood as
resistance to either private lawlessness or the depredations of a tyrannical gov-
ernment (or a threat from abroad)."' 3 Though Heller does not speak explicitly
to the guns and crime debate, it does nod to the significance of the self-defense
doctrine, and it takes seriously the notion that there is a connection between the
possession of a gun for self-defense and the prevention of crime. Furthermore,
as the case is adjudicated in the Supreme Court, it is likely to reinvigorate de-
127. Id. at 705.
128. Cook & Ludwig, supra note 5, at 2.
129. Id. at lo.
130. Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370 (D.C. Cir. 2007), cert. granted sub
nor. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 645 (2007).
131. Id.
132. Parker, 478 F.3d at 395. For an interesting description of Parker and Heller in the
context of the evolving academic debate around the individual rights versus col-
lective rights interpretations of the Second Amendment, see Adam Liptak, A Lib-
eral Case for the Individual Right to Own Guns Helps Sway the Federal Judiciary,
N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 2007, at A18.
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bate on both sides of the gun control aisle over the propriety of expansive or re-
strictive doctrines.33 Error-risk analysis must be a part of those debates.
The error-risk approach to criminal justice policy has implications above
and beyond gun laws; indeed, it could be applied to any other policy regime
that might disrupt the current tension. For example, using error risk as a lens to
examine the death penalty, one must ask whether a shift towards a prohibition
on the use of capital punishment' 34 will put a finger on the scale in favor of
false-positive minimization. Relaxation of restrictions on wiretapping' 3 might
cut the other way, as the innocent are more frequently caught-up or convicted.
Though the issue of legal defensive gun use (and the laws that permit it) fits
most crisply into an error-risk framework, this analytical tool can provide a
valuable new angle through which to examine other policy projects.
133. Indeed, as of February 25, 2008, sixty-seven amicus briefs had been filed in this
case, representing a wide range of advocacy groups, activists, attorneys, and politi-
cians. See Docket for 07-290, http://www.supremecourtus.gov/docket/07-29o.htm
(last visited Mar. iO, 2008).
134. See, e.g., Laura Mansnerus, Panel Seeks To End Death Penalty for New Jersey, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 3, 2007 at Ai.
135. See, e.g., James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Concerns Raised on Wider Spying Under
New Law, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 19, 2007, at Ai.

